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Living in the yellow zone: The political geography of intervention in Haiti
Nicolas Lemay-Hébert
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
A B S T R A C T
Every international intervention comes with its own security regulations, which contribute in turn to structure the political geography of the intervention, delimiting
areas of interaction between interveners and local population and shaping the political economy of intervention. The securitization of the everyday in Haiti took the
form of colour-coded security zones (green, yellow and red), with distinct security regulations for each. This article will analyse the specific everyday ramifications of
the security mapping in Haiti, focusing particularly on the vast yellow zone that covers residential areas in Port-au-Prince and the downtown area in dire need of
investment after the earthquake. Based on interviews conducted in Port-au-Prince in 2017 and 2018, the article will make three distinct arguments, underscoring the
ramifications of mapping as a spatial practice of securitization. First, by channelling expatriates to specific locations in the capital, and by preventing them from
occupying other zones in Port-au-Prince, the securitization practices contribute to the gentrification process around the Pétion-Ville area, contributing in their own
way to the deep-rooted social segregation process in play in Port-au-Prince. Second, it will analyse how these logics of securitization are linked to an ‘imagined
geography’ of the capital, where actual security risks matter less than logics of disassociation from areas perceived as having no interest for international actors.
Finally, the article will look at how security mapping is reappropriated and resisted by local actors, displaying a mix of resilience and self-help strategies. This article
makes a distinct contribution by linking critical cartography and international relations, especially the colour-coding and security mapping discussion with the
securitization and intervention literature.
1. Introduction
Sarah Collinson and Mark Duffield's realisation five years ago that
‘there has been surprisingly little research into how international
actors are actually responding to the real or perceived security risks
they face in these unstable environments’ (2013: 1) is still very re-
levant today. This is particularly true regarding how international
actors' practices of responding to security risks shape how space is
experienced. Interventions in a (post-)conflict or (post-)disaster con-
text are increasingly seen through a risk-assessment lens, where se-
curity zones are spatialized depending on perceived security or in-
security for international staff. In Haiti, security mapping has taken
shape through colour coding – with green zones deemed ‘safe’, yellow
zones ‘risky’ and red zones ‘to avoid’. Colour coding in the context of
security mapping is not new. The concept of ‘red zone’ – and its
counterpart, the ‘green zone’ – was used to read the security situation
in Iraq after the 2003 intervention (Vincent, 2004), and some authors
date it back to the First World War (Tidball & Krasny, 2014, p. 7).
Colour coding in the context of security mapping of international
interventions can also be understood as an extension of social carto-
graphy, with early examples being Charles Booth's map of London,
with each street coloured to indicate the income and social class of its
inhabitants (with the lowest class deemed ‘vicious, semi-criminal’),1
or redlining maps or ‘security maps’, used by mortgage lenders in the
United States in the New Deal era to assess risk for home loans in-
surance based on a colour chart (Nelson, 2018). More recently, colour
coding has also been used in the context of numerous interventions,
including in Kabul and Baghdad (the infamous ‘green zone’), in Mo-
gadishu (the ‘white zone’ seen as a secure zone for the government
and the international community), in Juba and Nairobi (the ‘blue
zone’ as a location approved by UN security authorities for interna-
tional UN staff to reside), or in Bangui and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (‘red zones’ or areas of unrest), to list a few recent ex-
amples.
Security maps are an integral part of broader assemblages of logics
of securitization, and the burgeoning literature on critical military
geography has contributed to enquiring how militarization shapes so-
cial and geographical spaces (Higate & Henry, 2011; Rech et al., 2015;
Woodward, 2004, 2005). However, so far, most of the work on the topic
has followed the premises of ‘traditional military geography’ and more
often than not has fallen into the ‘institutional’ category of political
geography of peacekeeping, especially with a focus on ‘buffer zones’,
‘security corridors’, and ‘security zones’ (see, for instance, Grundy-
Warr, 1994) – reminding us of the infamous United Nations safe areas
in Bosnia and Herzegovina or, more recently, the ‘safe zones’ in
Sri Lanka. Critical cartography – the analysis of how power works
through maps, informing how they are made, read and otherwise used –
has not made serious advances in the field of peacebuilding and
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international interventions.2 This contribution intends to adopt such an
approach on the practical politics of mapping and maps (Herb et al.,
2009, p. 335) by focusing on mapping (Kitchin & Dodge, 2007) as a
spatial practice of securitization. Mapping not only represents reality,
but also has an active role in the social construction of that reality
(Dodge, Kitchin, & Perkins, 2011: xx). This article inquires the ‘tactical
form of knowledge’ (Dalby, 2010, p. 280) behind the mapping of se-
curity zones of Port-au-Prince, demonstrating how this situated
knowledge cannot be dissociated from the social imaginary informing
the intervention in the first place. Furthermore, I will be analysing the
security map as a set of knowledge in a ‘state of becoming’ (Kitchin &
Dodge, 2007, p. 335), constantly reaffirmed and remade, but also re-
appropriated and contested, by actors on the receiving end of the se-
curitization practices.
A few other caveats regarding the positioning of this article vis-à-
vis the existing literature are also in order. The article will partly focus
on hotels in the yellow zone; thus, in addition to the critical carto-
graphy literature already mentioned, this article is also in conversa-
tion with a literature looking at how hotels become geopolitical sites,
connected to and embedded in broader geopolitical architectures and
geographies of security and insecurity (Fregonese & Ramadan, 2015;
Lisle, 2013; Smirl, 2015, 2016; for a particular focus on the Oloffson
Hotel in Haiti, see; Pettinger, 2013). This article adopts a slightly
different approach to the topic; it does not treat hotels as material
infrastructure transformed into ‘secure’ enclaves (Lisle, 2013), or
focus on them as spaces of interactions, liminality or mediation
(Craggs, 2012; Fregonese & Ramadan, 2015; Smirl, 2016), but aims
rather to highlight the effects of securitization practices on hotels lo-
cated in areas deemed insecure by producers of (in)security, as well as
highlighting the diversity of practices displayed by hotel owners and
other individuals located in the ‘yellow zone’ through an everyday
security perspective. In so doing, the article aims to bring closer to-
gether accounts of the critical approach to intervention and state-
building on the ‘everyday turn’, spaces and landscape (Autesserre,
2014; Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017; Duffield, 2010; Jennings & Bøås,
2015; Mac Ginty, 2017; Pouligny, 2006; Vogel, 2018) with the lit-
erature on (in)securitization practices.
Finally, this article further positions itself within the broad field of
securitization, understanding the concept not so much as the speech
acts of the security experts and the discursive practices of the profes-
sionals of insecurity (Huysmans, 2011; Wæver, 1995) as the ramifica-
tions of the everyday practices of security and insecurity (Balzacq et al.,
2010). Hence, the article aims to understand why and how securitiza-
tion happens, as well as the effects that this process has on the life and
the politics of a community (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 2016: 495).
In addition, this article adopts an ‘everyday security’ lens, or how
‘practices of security governance are experienced by different people
and groups “on the ground” so to speak, and how they are implicated
in, forged through and find expression via quotidian aspects of social
life’ (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1185). The article focuses more
on the ‘lived experiences of security processes’ – security measures in
practice exemplified by the cartography of security zones and its effects
– than on the ‘vernacular turn’ of security (Vaughan-Williams &
Stevens, 2016).3 As Jef Huysmans argues, security practices often
contain particular notions of everyday life, acting both as justification
for policies – in our case, the specific ‘security project’ implemented by
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – and as
a security instrument – the security map regulating the everyday of UN
expats (Huysmans, 2009, p. 197). Consequently, I hope this article will
make a specific contribution to the development of a distinct political
geography of securitization (Bernazzoli & Flint, 2009), but also to the
burgeoning sub-discipline of urban geopolitics (Graham, 2004; Rokem
et al., 2017), and especially everyday urban geopolitics (Fregonese, 2012:
295–296).
This article draws on rich empirical material gathered through
three main fieldwork visits, made in March 2017, June 2017 and
March 2018, in Port-au-Prince, where I interviewed officials from
MINUSTAH, officials from the United Nations Mission for Justice
Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH),4 local business owners (hotel owners)
living in the ‘yellow zone’ or being subject to similar regulations, and
local activists in the ‘red zone’ wishing to change the security reg-
ulations in their neighbourhood. Most interviews were conducted in
French, and excerpts used in the article have been translated into
English by the author. The hotel owners interviewed constitute a re-
presentative sample of the hotels not authorized by the UN, with the
Oloffson Hotel, Prince Hotel and Le Plaza Hotel catering for interna-
tional guests, Le Marcelin Inn with 10–20% international clientele
(mostly backpackers), and a hotel like the Fanm Vanyan Inn, which
caters mostly for local guests and the diaspora (mostly Haitian-
Americans or Haitian-Canadians visiting family in Port-au-Prince,
acting as an overflow hotel for Le Marcelin Inn). The research also
draws on past fieldwork material, dating back to 2011, as well as
additional email and Skype interviews with contacts living in Haiti
during the writing phase of this article.
In many respects, this article started off as a journey in the Oloffson
Hotel, where I stayed multiple times over the years. The article uses
many tweets and other material posted online by his ‘idiosyncratic
owner’ (Pettinger, 2013, p. 183), Richard A. Morse, a Haitian-Amer-
ican, cousin of former President Michel Martelly, with a degree in an-
thropology from Princeton and whose ‘political edge has sometimes
landed him in trouble with the authorities’. In recent years, he led a
very public charge against the security mapping of Port-au-Prince – by
the UN but also by the American Embassy. The Oloffson is located at a
crossroad between two very distinct areas: Pacot, a relatively affluent
area, and Carrefour Feuilles, an area considered ‘problematic’ despite a
general improvement of the security situation in this area, and as such
has been subject to security regulations. Even if it is not formally inside
the UN yellow zone (like Hotel Prince), it is generally not included in
the list of authorized hotels in Port-au-Prince for expatriates.5 His
public vendetta against ‘security entrepreneurs’ in the country helped
raised local and international awareness of the issues pertaining to se-
curity mapping in the capital.
Hence, the aim of the article is to investigate the politics of security
mapping and the ramifications of these security practices for local actors
living in these security zones. As such, the research addresses two
specific questions: (1) what logics of securitization does security mapping
serve? and (2) how do these securitization policies impact and shape
statebuilding processes in Haiti? In response to the first research
question, I argue that these securitization practices are driven by two
main factors. First, MINUSTAH linked them to the imagined geography
of Port-au-Prince – specifying the ways ‘the world is’ and, in so doing,
actively (re)making that same world in its image (Bialasiewicz et al.,
2007, p. 411; see also; Gregory, 1995; Graham, 2006). This imagined
geography is driven by an ‘empty-shell approach’ (Lemay-Hébert,
2011b), where in most of the city there is simply nothing of interest for
2 An exception is Jordan Branch's work (2014), analysing how mapping
technology (as a set of material tools and practices) has been connected with
the early modern transformation of the state.
3 For a good overview of security experiences in Haiti following the ‘verna-
cular turn’, see Higate & Henry, 2009.
4MINUSTAH has been active for 13 years, with the mission withdrawn in
April 2017 and a smaller mission, MINUJUSTH, established.
5 To see which hotels are included in this list, see for instance: http://dlca.
logcluster.org/download/attachments/853294/Haiti%20WFP%20approved
%20hotels%20October2011.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=
1379357731000&api=v2. For an example of the impact of the list on tourism,
see the discussion on the Lonely Planet's forum on “UN approved Hotels”:
https://www.lonelyplanet.com/thorntree/forums/americas-caribbean/haiti/
un-approved-hotels-in-port-au-prince.
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the UN. Second, it is driven by logics of bunkerization that are in-
creasingly constitutive elements of peacebuilding and statebuilding
practices (Andersson & Weigand, 2015; Duffield, 2010; Fisher, 2017).
In response to the second question, I will discuss how these practices
fall within the wider political geography of statebuilding processes in
Haiti, marked by a social segregation in different areas of the city. Thus,
security practices contribute to shaping statebuilding processes through
logics of inclusion and exclusion, contributing to broader dynamics of
the political economy of interventions.
The article is divided into five sections. The first analyses the con-
tested views on the perception of insecurity in Haiti and how a specific
reading of the risk assessment on the ground has enabled the UN mis-
sion to develop its own securitizing logics. The second section develops
the specific security-mapping practices of MINUSTAH, and how se-
curity regulations structure the everyday logics of the intervention. The
third section looks at how the political geography of the intervention is
connected with the deeper dynamics of socio-political segregation in
play in the political geography of the city – which are as old as the
country's independence – marked by a stark contrast between areas of
‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. The fourth section discusses the ‘imagined
geography’ of interveners. Finally, drawing from interview material
from activists in the so-called ‘red zone’, the article analyses the various
strategies deployed by local actors in the face of the securitization
move, marked by ‘self-help’, resilience-building and outright resistance
to these securitization strategies.
2. Creating a narrative of insecurity, securitizing the country
Most contemporary UN peacekeeping missions have displayed a
securitization discourse to various degrees, justifying their presence
and use of force to meet local threats, stigmatizing local actors deemed
‘problematic’ and reading local politics through their own security
lens. As such, MINUSTAH is hardly unique. However, it is the first
‘stabilization’ mission to be labelled as such by the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations.6 Stabilization activities are an integral part
of the renewal of international interventions after a period of ‘broken
promises’ in the early 1990s, and they are co-constitutive of a reliance
on the use of force by international actors such as the United Nations
to accomplish the mandate of the missions. One can even argue that
stabilization's contemporary focus and agenda evolved from the
shared experience of France, the UK and the USA in Afghanistan and
in Iraq in the 2000s, with the doctrines and policies around stabili-
zation missions developed by these countries in these contexts later
permeating the work of the UN in operations in Haiti and elsewhere
(de Coning 2018). Haiti also represents a microcosm of the doctrinal
evolution of peacekeeping over the years. MINUSTAH is the latest of
seven UN missions in the country – stretching over 20 years of inter-
national involvement in Haiti – and differs from preceding UN mis-
sions in Haiti through its greater emphasis on security (Lemay-Hébert,
2015, p. 722).
MINUSTAH was established in April 2004 and deployed in June that
year to facilitate the transition between a fleeing Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, who had lost the loyalty of some of his supporters and found
himself increasingly isolated, and a ‘government of technocrats’ headed
by Gérard Latortue to lead the transition to elections in 2006. The main
objective of MINUSTAH was to facilitate the transition between Aristide
and a government to be elected, and to re-establish stability in the
country. This emphasis on security was exemplified by the contributing
countries' lasting commitment in terms of troops and police since the
establishment of the mission (75% of the authorized personnel in
2016–17, representing roughly 50% of the budget before inclusion of
infrastructure expenses).7 MINUSTAH's security mandate has taken the
hybrid shape of support for the security sector reform process and direct
engagement in the ‘stabilization’ of the country. Both approaches to
‘stabilization’ (direct and indirect) have to be understood in connection
with the wider statebuilding process in Haiti, where the state – at least
the Western image of it – has never existed, at least not as a coherent
idea binding citizens together and reflecting a Rousseauian social
contract (Lemay-Hébert, 2014). It has consistently been a platform for
competing factions, vying for positions of power. In that context, the
joint approach of the Latortue government and MINUSTAH, which
would set the tone for the post-Aristide statebuilding process, was to
use a military solution to what is fundamentally a social problem, an-
chored in profound social, economic and cultural inequalities (Dupuy,
2007, pp. 179–180; Schuberth, 2017). MINUSTAH and the Haitian
National Police proceeded to ‘clean up’ the ‘difficult’ urban areas of Cité
Soleil (or Cite Soley in Haitian Creole) and Bel Air (see Fig. 2 for the
location of most neighbourhoods in the wider Port-au-Prince area).8
The securitizing move behind this approach was quite simply to equate
all Chimères or ‘armed gangs’ with ‘Lavalas Chimères’ (linking them with
the Aristide movement), and then these Chimères with bandits (Dupuy,
2007, p. 182; Fatton, 2007, p. 212; Muggah, 2010). Once labelled as
bandits, it was possible to properly ‘stabilize’ or ‘securitize’ the area,
and consequently the whole population living in ‘difficult neighbour-
hoods’ came to be defined as a security issue in a traditional secur-
itization move (Huysmans, 2006; Noxolo & Huysmans, 2009, p. 2).
The reality is that the fight against violence and insecurity in Haiti
has provided a very shaky foundation for the long-lasting presence of
the peace mission. In fact, in 2010 the homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000
inhabitants compared favourably with the rate in the Dominican
Republic (25 per 100,000), Trinidad and Tobago (26.1) and Jamaica
(41.2) (Mobekk, 2017, p. 43). The most recent figure available (2016) is
10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, again comparing favourably to
other countries in the region. In addition, Haiti has been ranked the
fourth most peaceful country out of 12 in Central America and the
Caribbean by the Global Peace Index (Institute for Peace and
Economics, 2017, p. 18). This leads the criminologist Arnaud Dandoy to
argue that
[w]aves of criminality in Haiti are often more imagined than real. If
one takes the trouble to read the statistics for what they really say,
one would realize that, in reality, little is known about crime in
Haiti. The systematic application of strict security regulations
therefore reflects the security ideology that prevails within the hu-
manitarian community rather than a contextualized analysis of the
security situation in the country. (Dandoy, 2013: 6; author's trans-
lation)
However, behind this lies conflicting security assessments by pol-
icymakers themselves. As the Chief Security Adviser of the current UN
mission explained to me in an interview, there is a distinction between
two schools of thought on the subject: one that tends to play down
positive reports of the security situation by arguing that ‘undercurrents’
are unreported and that one should not trust the security data, and
another noting that ‘nothing is happening here’ and that security in-
cidents should not be blown out of proportion.9 Representing the first
school of thought, the US State Department Bureau of Diplomatic
6 Followed by the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013 and the Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014.
7 Data available at www.un.org.en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/
factsheet.shtml#MINUST.
8 ‘Operation Baghdad’ was the name given by the interim government to the
ghetto uprising in an attempt to label the people fighting as terrorists. However,
the term was later adopted by the demonstrators themselves (Lunde, 2012, pp.
16–17).
9 Interview with Emmanuel Monjimbo, Chief Security Adviser, UN
Department of Safety and Security, MINUJUSTH, Delta Camp, 19 March 2018.
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Security's Overseas Security Advisory Council argues that ‘reports in-
dicating that Haiti is statistically safer than other countries in the
Caribbean are inaccurate’.10 Representing the second school, a former
UN spokesman, John Holmes, recognized a few months after the
earthquake that ‘it's very easy to convey the impression by focusing on a
particular incident that there's a major security law and order problem
arising in our view, [but] it is not the case’ (Landers, Millar, &
McMurtrie, 2010; the position was reiterated by the UNPOL spokes-
person in 2012: see Dandoy, 2013, pp. 16–17). This reflects the view
from national staff across different missions that international staff tend
to overestimate the risk in relation to local security conditions
(Egeland, Harmer, & Stoddard, 2011, p. 41). In general, this discussion
provides a good example of how the ‘definition of insecurities and the
nature and limits of securitizing’ (Noxolo & Huysmans, 2009, p. 2) are
‘negotiated’ and interpreted by different actors in Haiti.
3. Security mapping: securitization in practice
Through its work in Haiti, MINUSTAH has developed specific se-
curity-mapping practices for Port-au-Prince (see Fig. 1). The security
zones in this map are tied to security procedure, with every zone –
yellow or red – having specific security regulations attached to it.
Procedures in the yellow zone include a warning that ‘staff members
are strongly advised to exercise extreme caution and remain vigilant
when traveling to or through the yellow zone’. When ‘proceeding or
transiting the yellow zone’, security measures include the requirement
to carry fully charged and ready-to-use radios and a clearance from the
base, to be accompanied by at least one colleague, and to be out of the
zone before 17.00 h.11 After that time, the yellow zones become red
zones, which have stricter security procedures, in particular requiring a
military or Formed Police Unit escort for all travel within them. These
are UN regulations, and it is worth noting that different international
actors may use slightly different security maps. The UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office advises ‘against all but essential travel to the
Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Martissant and Bel Air neighbourhoods’,12 an
assessment shared by Global Affairs Canada.13 France lists the same
neighbourhoods as areas that one ‘should avoid’, adding Jean-Marie
Vincent to the list as well as ‘popular neighbourhoods and slums’ and
areas ‘near the port and airport’.14
The UN yellow zone as seen in Fig. 1 covers a huge portion of the
commune of Port-au-Prince. The arrondissement of Port-au-Prince is
constituted of eight communes: Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Cité Soleil,
Tabarre, Carrefour, Pétion-Ville, Kenscoff, and Gressier. The arrondis-
sement of Port-au-Prince is the largest in Haiti, with 2,759,991 in-
habitants in 2015 (out of a total national population of 10,911,819),
with the commune of Port-au-Prince numbering 987,310 inhabitants
(IHSI, 2015, pp. 21–23). The commune is in turn divided into 35
neighbourhoods (see Fig. 2), and the yellow zone cuts through a
number of these. The yellow zone comprises some of the most densely
populated areas of the city, and includes the historic city centre (centre-
ville) of Port-au-Prince.
Due to the loss of institutional memory – an acute problem in
peacekeeping operations with frequent staff turnovers (Curran, 2015;
UN, 2012, pp. 152–153) – compounded by the fact that the UN lost 102
members of its personnel during the 2010 earthquake when the MIN-
USTAH headquarters was levelled – it is difficult, if not nearly im-
possible, to adopt a historical approach to the evolution of security
mapping in Haiti. Interviewees I met in 2017 did not recall who first
adopted the security colour coding, and did not have – or did not want
me to access15 – previous maps. However, in 2017 the MINUSTAH chief
of security offered the explanation that security zones were invented in
2004 from scratch.16 According to him, other peace missions adopted
security colour coding around that time, but the system is gradually
being dropped because of a lack of standardized practice. Nevertheless,
and to give an idea of the situation immediately after the 2010 earth-
quake, one of the first security maps posted online (on flickr.com, see
Fig. 3) showed a slightly different risk assessment to 2017. For instance,
the red zones are wider, but there is a similarly large ‘yellow zone’
covering a similar territory than the 2017 map depicted in Fig. 1, with a
different tone of yellow for what appear to be slightly riskier zones. It is
possible that these areas were classified as ‘orange’ at that time.17
To a certain extent, focusing on the evolution of the security map
colour coding misses the bigger point, as discussed previously in the
introduction. The focus of this research is not so much on the map as an
object – a stable product – as on the politics of security mapping (Kitchin
& Dodge, 2007) and its implications. The reality, and this is worth em-
phasising, is that all areas of Port-au-Prince are considered risky. This is
clearly put forward in a confidential report produced for MINUSTAH,
which states that ‘every region in Port-au-Prince, at varying degrees, is at
risk’ (HaitiObservateur, 2006: 2). This is what appears particularly im-
portant to analyse, especially through the concept of ‘yellow zone’.
Cutting-edge research has been conducted on ‘red zones’ in Haiti, and
particularly in Cité Soleil, which we will draw from and expand to cover
the sprawling yellow zone. Higate and Henry, for instance, have bril-
liantly analysed the process of ‘pseudo-quarantine’ of the communities in
these areas (2009: 60) and how the ‘red zone’ label renders these spaces
‘invisible’ and thus unintelligible (2013: 140), while at the same time
capturing little of the vibrancy of local communities, but also how the
label produces insecurity and legitimizes militarized social practices from
intervenors (2009: 64–65). However, beyond the ‘red zone’ areas, little
work has been done on the concept of ‘yellow zone’, and how (in)security
practices by the UN impact everyday life in these areas.
4. The two worlds that make up Haiti
As discussed earlier, it is misleading (and ultimately ‘Orientalizing’)
to approach Haitian politics through the prism of Western social con-
tract theories. Haitian politics have been marked by a zero-sum game
orchestrated by ‘predatory elites’ (Maguire, 1995), resting on stark10 See https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21726
(updated 26 April 2017).
11 United Nations, “Security Advisory” (internal document, on file with au-
thor).
12 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Foreign Travel Advice Haiti”,
available at: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/haiti (last accessed 20
March 2017).
13 Global Affairs Canada, “Haiti”, available at: https://travel.gc.ca/
destinations/haiti?_ga=1.50296928.719478103.1490024707 (last accessed
20 March 2017).
14 France Diplomatie, “Haiti”, available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs/conseils-par-pays/haiti/(last accessed 20 March
2017). Other ‘security assessments’ include UNICEF's, which defines the ‘green
zone’ as covering the eastern part of the city (including the airport, Pétion-Ville
and Tabarre), the ‘yellow zone’ as covering the western part of the city, and ‘red
zones’ including Belair and Boston. See: https://www.unicef.org/haiti/french/
FR_UNICEF_Haiti_-_Rapport_des_Six_Mois.pdf: 31.
15 This is a typical problem for critical military geographies. As Rachel
Woodward explains, ‘information is often not available because it just has not
been collected, or is not available in forms that have any real utility for social
scientific research. Data is often withheld, judged secret in the interests of
national security’ (2005: 730).
16 Interview with Banding Drame, chief of security, MINUSTAH, Port-au-
Prince, 13 March 2017.
17 As one aid worker recalled in 2010: ‘One friend showed me the map, used
by all of the larger NGOs where Port au Prince is divided into security zones,
yellow, orange, red. Red zones are restricted, in the orange zones all of the car
windows must be rolled up and they cannot be visited past certain times of day,
even in the yellow zones aid workers are often not permitted to walk through
the streets and spend much of their time in Haiti riding through the city from
one office to another in organizational vehicles’ (Kramer, 2010).
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social divisions between Haiti's impoverished majority (pèp la in Haitian
Creole) and the wealthy few.18 This social division has also shaped the
political geography of Haiti and its capital city. For a long time, pea-
sants had to have their activity shown in their passports, labelling them
as ‘moun andeyo’ (outsiders) who are not part of the nation and are
excluded from its benefits and recognition (Barthélémy, 1989). Haiti
still hosts two disparate societies in an unofficial apartheid (Bell, 2013,
p. 30). The geography of Port-au-Prince also reflects this sharp social
division. Port-au-Prince has been through a progressive process of
‘popularisation of certain neighbourhoods’ (Schuller, 2016, p. 35),
especially the ‘lower’ neighbourhoods – signifying a proximity to sea
level but also socioeconomic status – while, at the same time, the elite
has occupied the ‘higher’ locations, especially around Pétion-Ville.
There is a Haitian (or Port-au-Prince) saying that ‘l'argent reste dans les
hauteurs, il ne descend pas' – ‘the money remains up above, it does not
come down’. Haiti can hence be seen as a ‘constant crisis between two
worlds: Pétion-Ville and Port-au-Prince’.19
For most expats, this entails in practice embracing the local bour-
geoisie as well as a withdrawal from everyday engagement with po-
pulations in the yellow or red zones, a withdrawal combined with a
concurrent securitization of these spaces by military actors. Most areas
of Port-au-Prince, including the whole downtown area, are considered
part of this yellow zone, where exercising caution is mandatory.
Security regulations enforced by the UN and other international agen-
cies have profound effects on the architecture of the city, reinforcing
the existing social segregation and helping to empty the securitized
areas of any public utility operations. These zones become transit
spaces, where locals live but are not acknowledged.
Conversely, the other zones – ‘green’ or simply without a colour
code indicating caution – become beacons to the international com-
munity, leading to a concentration of international actors there and the
reshaping of the socioeconomic fabric of these areas. In contrast with
the literature on ‘bunkerization’, ‘green zones’ are not simply ‘entirely
inaccessible to locals and detached from the local social context’, as
discussed by Collinson and Duffield (2013: 7). The green zones are, at
least in Haiti, distinctively rooted and embedded in local power struc-
tures. They are not remote and detached – on the contrary, they are an
integral part of the political geography of segregation between the
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, rooted in the long colonial and post-colonial
history of the island. Similarly, the side-effects of securitizing practices
do not simply affect the ‘internationals’ but also the local power
Fig. 1. Red and yellow zones, Port-au-Prince, March 2017. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web
version of this article.)
Source: map on file with the author
18 This is not an analysis that is simply shared by critical, neo-Marxist
scholars. In the words of the World Bank, ‘Although it remains limited to date,
available information on private enterprises suggests that the large families that
dominated the Haitian economy during the Duvalier era during the 1970s and
1980s still retain control of large parts of the national economy, leading to a
strong concentration of power in a number of key industries’ (World Bank,
2016, p. 2; author's translation). For Arnaud Robert, the ‘bourgeois’ are the ‘3%
of the wealthy who manage 80% of the country's economy’ (2012; author's
translation).
19 Interview with Marc Fred Pierre-Louis, General Manager of Le Plaza Hotel,
(footnote continued)
14 March 2017, Port-au-Prince.
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structures embedded in the security mapping process: ‘they feel be-
sieged. The mountains where they live are gradually nibbled at by
fellow citizens who track their crumbs’ (Woods & Robert, 2013, p. 64;
author's translation).
In that context, MINUSTAH's securitization practices have not only
helped to shape this specific socio-political geography through its se-
curity zones, but also were seen as revealing its own political hand to
the Haitians. For one of our interviewees, ‘the UN is part of the Pétion-
Ville social class [classe de Pétion-Ville]. It protects people from Pétion-
Ville, people with means’.20 That led Timothy Schwartz to say that ‘the
Fig. 2. Districts of port-au-prince (in French).
Source: UN Habitat and Port-au-Prince City Council, “The 35 Districts of Port-au-Prince”, available at: https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/P-
codes%20Port-au-Prince%20Map%20grands%20quartiers%20110828.pdf
Fig. 3. Red, yellow and green zones on security map of Port-au-Prince, March 2010. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the Web version of this article.)
Source: Ansel Herz, flickr account, available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/mediahacker/4425181780
20 Interview with Jean Presnet, Manager, Le Marcelin Inn, Port-au-Prince, 17
March 2017.
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green zones were aptly named: they were places where the people the
poor call the boujwa [bourgeoisie] made new fortunes, or added to old
ones’ (Schwartz, 2017). This is echoed by Richard Morse, owner of the
Oloffson Hotel:
Eventually I realized that the RED ZONE concept had morphed into
another reality. RED ZONE now began to mean; “we don't want you
to spend money there”. “We don't want you hanging out there.”
“Thats [sic] a poor or middle class area and we don't want you or us
to be seen there.” “We want you to go spend your money in the
GREEN ZONE.” “We want you to go to these specific hotels, these
restaurants and this part of town.” (Morse, 2010; emphasis original)
Hence, the socio-political geography of securitization practices
helped to fuel an economic bubble in Pétion-Ville, and concomitant
logics of rentierism (Lemay-Hébert, 2011a). In recent years, Pétion-
Ville has evolved from a municipality with a residential character to be
the economic hub of the largest metropolitan area in the country – so
much so that, in the words of Jerry Tardieu, the member of parliament
for Pétion-Ville, the district can now be called the ‘economic, tourism,
commercial and cultural lung of the Haitian capital’ (Tardieu, 2017). In
this neighbourhood, the rent of houses once available for US$2000 or
$3000 a month rose to between $7000 and $10,000 a month after the
January 2010 earthquake (Redon, 2004, p. 304).
5. Bunkerization, ‘imagined geography’, and the shifting
perceptions of risk
The security logics at play may be linked to an aim to ‘depoliticize’
security politics; at least, the insistence of MINUSTAH's chief of security
that ‘there is nothing political in the risk assessment’21 seems to give
credence to that interpretation (see also Dandoy, 2013, p. 9). However,
there is also a logic of bunkerization and of securitization of the self at
work (Lemay-Hébert, 2019), where these rather arbitrary spatial cate-
gorizations are primarily meant for international consumption. In fact,
securitization practices are as driven by risk-aversion logics and logics
of insurance22 as they are about logics of dissociation. As the MINUS-
TAH chief of security put it to me, ‘if we don't have people there, then
we don't have to security manage it’.23 Hence, embodying the neat logic
of exclusion, he argues that ‘regulations are for us, not for “them”’.24 As
one of his colleagues added, ‘this is for internal purposes’.25 Interest-
ingly, this interpretation is shared by a hotel manager in the downtown
area: ‘there is nothing for them here’. However, he adds that it is a
‘Catch-22 situation. They can't stop here because it is a yellow zone.’26
In addition, these securitization practices are driven by a specific
reading of security on the ground. As one of my interviewees put it, the
security zones ‘made sense at the time; they don't any more’.27 There
was a geography of resistance in Haitian politics around 2004, when
demonstrators came from the Bel Air and Saint-Martin districts to go to
the Champs de Mars to demonstrate in front of the physical re-
presentation of the institutions of power, such as the presidential pa-
lace. The earthquake changed the political landscape, with demon-
strations increasingly happening in Pétion-Ville,28 around the Karibe
Hotel or Place Saint-Pierre, which meant that ‘crime is there now!’ It
felt ‘safer here than in Pétion-Ville. People get mugged there, problems
are there, not here [downtown]’.29 According to the owner of another
business located in the downtown area, ‘Pétion-Ville should be the
yellow zone, not here!’30 This is a reality recognized by the district's
congressman, Jerry Tardieu, noting the rampant insecurity in Pétion-
Ville, characterized by a wave of attacks against a ‘specific clientele’
(Daniel Sénat, 2017). Hence, if for a MINUSTAH spokesperson, ‘green
(covering Petionville only) indicates residential areas with no history of
insecurity’,31 this interpretation is challenged by the reality on the
ground.
This leads some to say that ‘the insecurity [in the yellow zone] is a
creation of the internationals’.32 In the words of one of Arnaud Dan-
doy's interviewees, an expat describing the process of listing what areas
are dangerous,
when many NGOs arrived in 2010, they probably said ‘Cité Soleil is
dangerous’, ‘Martissant is dangerous’, ‘Carrefour is dangerous’. Bam,
bam, bam – red zone. For us, that's our three red zones. When I
arrived, I said, ‘All right, these are dangerous areas, we will not go
there’. But, between you and me, there are places in Pétion-Ville that
are more dangerous than places in Cité Soleil … (Dandoy, 2013: 39;
author's translation).33
To give an indication of where the actual security incidents take
place, an overview of security incidents specifically involving UN per-
sonnel highlights the fact that ‘insecure’ areas are where international
are active (Tabarre for instance). MINUJUSTH officials gave me access
to UN's log of security incidents covering the period 1 October–31
December 2017. Over this three-month period, 18 incidents involving
United Nations personnel were reported: eight criminal incidents (three
armed robberies; three instances of robbery, theft or attempted robbery;
one theft of a UN vehicle; and one attempted break-in at the UN
compound); seven incidents of civil unrest including damage to UN
vehicles; and three road traffic accidents involving the UN. Of all these
events, only three occurred in ‘yellow zone’ areas: one incident of civil
unrest in front of the Faculty of Ethnology of the State University of
Haiti; one incident of civil unrest in Grand Ravine; and one armed
robbery in Solino 24. By comparison, five incidents occurred outside
Port-au-Prince, five in the Tabarre area (where the UN compound and
several embassies are located), two on Delmas Road, one of the city's
major arteries, and one in the wider Pétion-Ville area. When asked for
any further evidence, UN security personnel revealed that, for the
21 Interview with Drame.
22 As one travel memoir highlights (through an interview with a UNICEF
worker in Haiti), the security constraints are dictated more by UNICEF's in-
surers than by a rational risk-benefit analysis (Evans, 2015, p. 132).
23 Interview with Drame.
24 Evans, 2015.
25 Interview with Mr. Gonzalez, Deputy Chief Security Officer in charge of
operations, MINUSTAH, 7 June 2017, Port-au-Prince.
26 Interview with Pierre-Louis. A further reason given to explain the lack of
development of the downtown area is the government decision on 2 September
2010 to make a huge part of the area a ‘public utility’ zone, de facto ex-
propriating the landowners in the area. On 25 May 2012, the Martelly gov-
ernment indicated that the area would be turned into an ‘administrative estate’
[cité administrative], but it has not further clarified its vision for the area. On 30
June 2017, the Jovenel government expanded the public utility zone for the
reconstruction of public buildings.
27 Interview with Pierre-Louis.
28 An analysis of the security briefs issued by the US Embassy and by the
private security company Garda highlights the many protests in Pétion-Ville,
with demonstrations occurring on 14 July, 25 July, 30 September, and 24
October 2017.
29 Interview with Pierre-Louis. This analysis is corroborated by the British
government's travel advice, which notes that ‘there has been an increase in
violent muggings, some of which have resulted in fatalities, in areas popular
with foreign residents, such as Petionville’. See: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-
travel-advice/haiti/safety-and-security.
30 Interview with Presnet.
31MINUSTAH spokesperson, quoted by Ansel Heck, available at: https://
www.flickr.com/photos/mediahacker/4425181780.
32 Interview with Plaisimond Choute Rosalie, owner and manager, Fanm
Vanyan Inn, 17 March 2017, Port-au-Prince.
33 This opinion is shared by another expatriate, interviewed by Arnaud
Dandoy: ‘Petion Ville remains a green zone for us, although this does not mean
that Petion Ville is safer than the other places; quite the contrary, with the
concentration of all the activities in Petion Ville’ (2013: 44; author's transla-
tion).
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period 19 February to 18 March 2018, four major incidents of armed
robbery were reported, and again these happened outside the security
zones. One armed robbery took place in front of the security compound
(Delta Camp, in the Tabarre area), one attempted robbery in the Vivy
Mitchell area, and two armed robberies at the international airport
(Tabarre area). More recently, there were widespread popular demon-
strations on the 6th and 7th of July 2018, which began after the
Commerce Ministry and Economic Ministry issued a joint statement
announcing an increase of 38 percent to 51 percent for gasoline, diesel
and kerosene. The policy was later reversed, but the rioting engulfed
parts of Pétion-Ville, with ‘rioting, looting and fires at the Oasis Hotel’
(CNN, 2018) and in other ‘Green zone’ hotels (Best Western or Mar-
riott), leaving more than 200 expatriates to hide in hotels while in-
security was rampant in the streets.
This ‘imagined geography’ of insecurity in Port-au-Prince where the
‘yellow zone’ plays such a prominent role is well captured in a visual
representation of the security zones in the Haiti Security Orientation
Briefing by the UN Department of Safety and Security in May 2014 (see
Fig. 4), where the UN security zones are associated with ‘hot areas’ of
local crime, and illustrated by pictures of what appears like tightly
packaged drugs and guns. Interestingly, this visual representation of
insecurity was not used in the same briefing of October 2015, with
pictures of guns and drugs disappearing from the presentation.
The use of colour coding by MINUSTAH and other international
actors creates its own reality on the ground. For Louino Robillard, a
community leader in Cité Soleil,
MINUSTAH didn't create this stigma, but their categorization of it as
a ‘red zone’ was an institutional validation of that stigma. It was a
bureaucratic equivalent of the physical concrete barriers they
erected around the entrances to Cité Soleil during the wars of
2004–2006.34
For another community leader in Cité Soleil, Daniel Tillias, ‘one of
the consequences of the red zone label is that people see themselves as
red’.35 As Richard Morse, owner of the Oloffson Hotel, further suggests,
the security zones are more than physical zones, they are also ‘imagined
geography’:
there's a new kind of RED ZONE. It's the one where some people tell
you you're not in the RED ZONE, and the map shows that you're not
in the RED ZONE. Yet ‘people in the know’ tell you, ‘Rich, believe
me, you're in the RED ZONE’. (Morse, 2010; emphasis original)
This creates (or reinforces) a social reality of (in)security between
the so-called ‘green zone’ and the rest of Port-au-Prince. As a traveller
noted in a Trip Advisor review of Le Plaza Hotel, ‘we did not expect that
there is a lovely hotel like this in the downtown of Port au prince red
zone area’.36 This doesn't affect only expats and tourists: ‘people from
Fig. 4. Security zones as areas of insecurity.
Source: UNDSS, Haiti Security Orientation Briefing, May 2014. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/
documents/files/Security%20Orientation%20Briefing_SOB_as%20of%202014_05.pdf
34 Interview by email with Louino Robillard, Community Leader, Cité Soleil,
1 August 2017.
35 Interview by Skype with Daniel Tillias, Community Leader, Cité Soleil, 10
November 2017.
36 It should be noted that Le Plaza Hotel is actually located in the yellow
zone, not the red zone. https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/ShowUserReviews-
g147307-d148133-r268519618-Le_Plaza_Hotel-Port_au_Prince_Ouest_
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the diaspora are also nervous about security issues’.37 This proves the
point made by Dodge, Kitchin and Perkins that maps work because they
are about selling a particular vision of the world and because people are
willing to buy into this vision (2011: xx). Additionally, security map-
ping in Port-au-Prince is also a good example of the ‘recursive proleptic
effect’ of mapping, or how maps contribute to the construction of spaces
that they later seem only to represent (Sparke, 1998, p. 466).
6. ‘Greening’ strategies: self-help and resilience-building in the
face of securitization practices
Being in a red or yellow zone means that expats have to apply strict
security regulations when interacting with locals. It can also mean that
local communities can only rely on themselves in difficult times. As one
Haitian-American realized after the 2010 earthquake: ‘we only found
out for folks in our community [Carrefour-Feuilles] that it was a red
zone because we weren't getting any help’ (Herz, 2010).38 In other
cases, security concerns led the UN to airdrop food aid in Léogane, a
community not particularly known for being difficult (Laughlin, 2010).
In this context, and to take the local community's perspective, the only
way out of this situation – at least theoretically – is to change the se-
curity situation on the ground and successfully lobby the UN to amend
its risk assessment. These logics lead to locally-led ‘resilience-building’
practices and self-help strategies, aimed at reversing international risk
perception. The concept of ‘greening’ encapsulates communities' efforts
to escape the labels of yellow and red zones, vying for the mythical
‘green label’.39
A good example of ‘greening’ practices comes from Bel Air, where in
2009 a petition signed by 36,515 citizens (claimed by the organisers to
be 60% of the population of the neighbourhood) was presented to the
Haitian prime minister, arguably an official who could not do much to
modify UN security assessments. ‘We want to get out of red to become
green,’ argued one of the organisers, adding that ‘we are ready to
welcome investors’ (Alphonse, 2009; author's translation). When re-
ceiving the petition, the prime minister, Ms. Michèle Pierre-Louis,
added that ‘green is a powerful symbol. It means that we can go for-
ward.’ She thus wanted ‘green [to] become the symbol of all districts
wishing for Haiti's progress' (Alphonse, 2009; author's translation).
Another example of a focus on security labelling through practices is
the area of Carrefour-Feuilles, where one of the listed accomplishments
of a recycling project financed by the IBSA Fund (Facility for Poverty
and Hunger Alleviation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue
Forum) was directly related to the security colour coding of the area:
‘Thanks to pacification initiatives, including this project, Carrefour
Feuilles was reclassified in 2009 from a security red zone to a yellow
zone’.40 A further example is in Cité Soleil, where local community
groups ‘celebrate [d] the decision [of] several members of the Inter-
national Community to recognize our mutual success by reclassifying
Cite Soleil as a “yellow zone”’ (Haiti Libre, 2012). In the words of their
representatives: ‘This is a momentous step towards our common vision
to see Cite Soleil change from a “red zone”, cut off from the rest of Haiti
because of security restrictions, to a “green zone” (an example of co-
operation, innovation and sustainability for the rest of the country)’
(Haiti Libre, 2012). The organisers organised a ‘grand day of reflection
[and] action’, inviting people to wear any item of green clothing to
affirm their vision of a Cité Soleil ‘green zone’. In the words of Louino
Robillard, one of the leaders of the movement, ‘the movement sent out
press releases saying that Cite Soleil was declaring itself to no longer be
a red zone, because even if no one else recognized our progress towards
peace and interdependence, we would recognize it ourselves’.41 Even if
the neighbourhood has since been reintegrated into the ‘red zone’ list
(or possibly never left it), the goal for residents is still ‘to turn it from a
red zone to yellow and then green,’ as stated by a local NGO leader,
Daniel Tillias (Roshan Lall, 2014).42 According to Tillias, one way to
access this new status is through community gardens and other en-
vironmental projects in Cité Soleil, making the link with ‘greening’ all
the more relevant and making this bid to become a ‘green zone’ like
Pétion-Ville a ‘possible and realistic outcome’.43
Beyond the issue of whether or not security regulations can really be
modified, the fight to change security perceptions has now escalated to
a new level, according to Louino Robillard:
It is entirely possible that Cite Soleil is still officially or technically a
red zone for MINUSTAH. But at this point, I don't think we care that
much anymore. With the advent of social media and an internet-
literate youth, we have taken the battle to defending [sic] our image
to a whole new level. We do exchange with other communities, we
highlight our artists and athletes, we have the Cite Soleil Peace
Prize, we work with journalists and multimedia professionals, we
have social media campaigns. Whether or not MINUSTAH changes
its designation has less importance to us today than it did 5 years
ago …. What we didn't like was the institutional validation of the
stigma that being a ‘Red zone’ brought us, but we are not measuring
our progress on MINUSTAH's color chart.44
The business owners in the ‘yellow zone’ I interviewed display a set
of very different self-help strategies. For some, there are simply not
enough businesses of interest to the internationals to come together and
put pressure on the UN, and hence they do not bother trying to change
the regulations once they understand that the root causes of this se-
curity policy are ‘a mix of incompetence and carelessness [‘je m'en
foutisme’]’.45
7. Conclusion
This article has made a case for connecting critical geography with
international relations, especially colour-coding and security mapping
with the securitization and intervention literature. These literature are
increasingly cross-fertilizing, especially in the field of critical peace and
conflict studies, but few are making the additional leap to connect their
arguments with the critical cartography literature. This article does that
by underscoring the ramifications of mapping as a distinct spatial
practice of securitization. Through an in-depth case study of the UN
security zones in Port-au-Prince, this article underlines the logics of
(footnote continued)
Department_Haiti.html.
37 Interview with Rosalie.
38 This issue was also raised by Richard Morse, owner of the Oloffson Hotel,
adjacent to Carrefour-Feuilles, in a tweet (@RAMHaiti) on 18 January 2010:
‘The Oloffson is “RED ZONE” How can the UN help the people of Carrefour
Feuille if they are prohibited from coming to the neighbourhood!!’ (see also:
Democracy Now!, 2010).
39 Thus reflecting the ‘greening’ resilience literature, which studies how
‘providing spaces for individuals and communities to engage in greening will
contribute to a community's ability to adapt and transform in the face of dis-
aster’ (Tidball & Krasny, 2014, p. 8).
40 See: http://tcdc2.undp.org/ibsa/Upload/Project%20profile/haiti.pdf.
This reclassification happened in 2008, according to UNDP, which also funded
the project (UNDP, 2011, p. 12). The author has contributed to a documentary
on this project, highlighting its impact on the security situation: https://vimeo.
com/18668506.
41 Interview with Robillard.
42 Daniel Tillias repeated this assertion in the BBC World Service ‘Outlook’
programme on 4 April 2017, saying that he believed the zone was now yellow
according to UN regulations, but that local residents vied for green zone status.
See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04y3yw8.
43 Interview with Tillias, 10 November 2017. Interestingly, the interviewee
said that the final aim is to rebuild a greener Haiti, similar to what Haiti was
like before Christopher Columbus' arrival on its shores.
44 Interview with Robillard.
45 Interview with Pierre-Louis.
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securitization behind the security mapping practices, but also how these
practices are linked to the wider Haitian statebuilding process.
A few conclusions can be drawn from this research. First, it appears
that securitization practices in Haiti reflect an imagined geography of
the capital city, which has little to do with actual shifting patterns of
risks to international expatriates. There are multiple explanations for
this, but one local hotel owner volunteered an additional, more cynical
one: ‘UN staffers will start a revolution if you tell them that they can't
party in Pétion-Ville any more’.46 When discussing the construction of
insecurity by international actors, other alternative explanations may
require further examination, especially the one that says that security
regulations are kept as they are despite the changing security landscape
in order to justify the lucrative bonuses that expat personnel earn when
posted to difficult areas (Pettinger, 2013, p. 190).47 Some of these are
quite practical: ‘there is nothing for us there,’ as one interviewee
pointed out when trying to explain why the ‘yellow zone’ had not been
modified over the years. When confronted with crime figures for Pé-
tion-Ville, MINUSTAH officials interviewed for the purpose of this ar-
ticle suggested that this helped explain why the UN police had such a
presence in this area, providing an ex post justification for the inter-
national presence in the district. Interestingly, the current UN mission
(MINUJUSTH) aims to revisit the boundaries of the security zones, ef-
fectively ‘shrinking the yellow zone’ in order to avoid ‘restricting the
movement of people unduly.’48 This position is taken on the basis of a
different reading of insecurity in the country. As MINUJUSTH's Chief
Security Adviser asserts: ‘The country needs a new security risk as-
sessment. It is not a high-risk country. There is no terrorism, no conflict
in Haiti. You have crime and civil unrest, but not unlike many countries
… All in all, it is a low-risk duty station.’ He adds that ‘we are talking
about protests, not riots. Demonstrations are not real areas of concern;
there is simply a need to brief staff to avoid these areas.’49 This led the
Chief Security Adviser to question the current policies in interesting
ways. For instance, the UN mission will review why it is more peaceful
in the ‘yellow zone’, aiming to understand if it is inherently more secure
or simply correlated with the fact that the UN is not present there.
A second finding that emerges from this research is that secur-
itization strategies as displayed under MINUSTAH are embedded within
wider logics of social segregation in Haiti – hence becoming an integral
part of statebuilding and nation-building processes (Lemay-Hébert,
2009). The story of Haiti has been one of a clear distinction between the
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, marked by economic, political, racial, and
linguistic divisions. The international intervention plays into these di-
visions, influencing in its own way the socio-political geography of
Port-au-Prince by directing investments towards the already most af-
fluent part of the city. Moreover, neighbourhoods are ‘lived spaces’;
most international actors will operate in districts they are already im-
planted in and where they know the configurations – in other words,
‘neighbourhoods of intervention’ (Lombart, Pierrat, & Redon, 2014, p.
110). The distancing from and growing estrangement with whole sec-
tions of the urban landscape has inevitable ramifications for develop-
ment work.
A third and final finding is that local actors are not passive parti-
cipants in the face of these securitization strategies. Even if they cannot
effectively pressure an actor such as the UN to change its security
regulations, local actors have displayed a mix of tactics, mostly driven
by self-help and resilience-building strategies. This is consistent with
research on the study of security and the everyday, analysing the
constant (re-)negotiation of practices and discourses of insecurity on
the ground. This article demonstrated how security mapping and its
underlying logics are to a certain extent reappropriated by local actors
as part of a wider battle to retake control and ownership of the narra-
tives produced on Port-au-Prince and Haiti. The article suggested the
concept of ‘greening’ to capture this willingness to shift colour encoding
of security zones from ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ to the ‘green’ status (along with
the advantages the status procures).
Other implications of this research would merit further attention.
One implication of securitization practices not discussed in this article
is the physical and social separation between international staff and
national field staff and the stark difference in their relative exposure to
risk and access to protection and other benefits (Collinson & Duffield,
2013, p. v; Dandoy, 2013, p. 6; Egeland et al., 2011, pp. 40–41). As
argued in this article, security mapping is first and foremost for ex-
patriate consumption, and hence security protocols do not formally
apply to national field staff. This could mean that local staff will unduly
be relied upon when the time comes to conduct a project or hold a
meeting in a yellow or red zone. Alternatively, national field staff can
also serve as a bridge between an increasingly isolated expat commu-
nity socialized within the most privileged and affluent sector of Port-au-
Prince and the rest of the population living in the wider metropolitan
area. This, in turn, raises the issue that the securitization practices at
play in Haiti also cast doubt on the ability of peacekeepers (or other
international workers) to build effective relationships with the local
population.50 Having to drive with windows up and doors locked
through most of the capital will undoubtedly affect one's capacity to
interact positively with the local population and gain its trust.
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